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NOTES 
CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT:  
WHAT IS A QUALIFYING INVESTMENT  
UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
AND WHY THE DEBATE MUST END 
Jeremy Marc Exelbert* 
 
Someone should really give those lawyers a pat on the back.  And a punch 
in the face.  But a pat on the back first.1 
 
International investment has helped to pave the way for an increasingly 
globalized world community.  Consequently, the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investor Disputes (ICSID)—existing under the mandate of the 
World Bank and with the stated purpose of increasing economic 
development abroad—has become the leading international arbitration 
mechanism currently available for settling disputes arising out of such 
investments.  It is unsettling, therefore, that the interpretation of 
“investment” within article 25 of the ICSID Convention (the provision that 
determines whether an ICSID tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over a 
dispute) has given rise to a unique interpretive controversy because the 
ICSID Convention fails to define “investment.” 
Accordingly, ICSID tribunals (bound neither by precedent nor a 
definition of “investment” contained within the ICSID Convention) have 
interpreted the term inconsistently, providing a source of unpredictability 
for investors and host countries alike, as they are unable to adequately 
ascertain whether an investment in their eyes is an investment that qualifies 
for ICSID protection.  Given the associated risks with international 
investment generally, such unpredictability unnecessarily increases the 
costs of foreign investment, impeding efficient economic growth abroad.  
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Boston University.  
I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Susan D. Franck, for her expertise, 
encouragement, and advice.  Similarly, I would like to thank Professor Julian Arato of 
Brooklyn Law School, who took the time to sit and discuss several aspects of this Note with 
me.  I would also like to thank the editors and staff of Fordham Law Review.  Finally, thank 
you to my friends and family for their constant love and support. 
 
 1. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:  Tobacco (HBO television broadcast Feb. 15, 
2015) (referencing Phillip Morris’s threat to bring Australia to ICSID arbitration by way of a 
favorable investment treaty between Australia and China). 
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An unfortunate consequence of this controversy is that many ICSID 
tribunals have taken an investor-centric view, going so far as to exercise 
jurisdiction over activities that directly contravene the ICSID Convention’s 
stated purpose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the “Wild West” of international investment law, little is certain.  It 
should come as no surprise, therefore, that there exists almost no consensus 
as to the correct definition of an objectively essential term:  “investment.”  
Of particular concern, however, is that the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“the 
ICSID Convention” or “the Convention”), which effectively governs the 
most important arbitration and dispute resolution mechanism for conflicts 
arising out of international investments, fails to define the term for purposes 
of determining its own jurisdiction.2  This has led to International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals frequently 
 
 2. See infra Part I.A (providing a detailed discussion of ICSID, its purpose, history, and 
structure). 
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interpreting the term inconsistently, fostering an inequitable administration 
of justice. 
There is significant debate among scholars and arbitrators alike as to 
whether—and how—this word, which itself is found within article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention,3 should be interpreted for such purposes.  As this Note 
explores, there are two basic approaches that tribunals have taken to address 
the matter.  First, there is the traditional approach, which involves deferring 
to a definition of “investment” as consented to by the parties to the dispute 
(typically found within the relevant bilateral investment treaty language).4  
The second, more restrictive approach, which resulted from the decision 
rendered in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco,5 is a four-
pronged objective test.6  Used to determine investment qualification, the 
Salini test functions in addition to the requirement that an investment fall 
under the relevant treaty’s own definition of the term.7  Tribunals frequently 
apply variations of this approach—oftentimes removing or adding criteria.8 
Although other solutions have been suggested,9 a tribunal has essentially 
two options at its disposal for the purposes of determining the existence of a 
jurisdictionally sufficient “investment”:  (1) defer to the treaty’s own 
definition of the term or (2) take the restrictive approach as outlined in 
Salini.  Modified approaches typically fall somewhere in between.10 
This Note seeks to address what is essentially a subject matter 
jurisdiction question in ICSID arbitration:  What is the correct interpretation 
of “investment” within the meaning of article 25 of the ICSID Convention?  
Specifically, this Note addresses the varying justifications for the 
approaches mentioned above, whether there is a superior approach among 
them and, if not, whether a viable alternative exists.  To adequately 
reconcile the goals of the Convention—and the World Bank by extension—
a qualifying investment under article 25 should only have two 
requirements:  (1) the activity or asset comprising it must, at the 
 
 3. Article 25 stipulates an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional requirements. See infra Part 
I.B.3. 
 4. It should be noted, however, that access to a tribunal is not necessarily contingent 
upon a bilateral investment treaty’s consent to jurisdiction.  Written consent via an 
investment agreement, for instance, is also permissible. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 
(2003). 
 6. See id. ¶¶ 52–54. 
 7. See infra Part I.A.  This is referred to as the “consent” requirement. 
 8. See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 211–217 (Sept. 27, 2012), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (applying only three of 
the Salini factors) [https://perma.cc/KB6C-XG7R]. 
 9. See generally Helena Jung Engfeldt, Should ICSID Go Gangnam Style in Light of 
Non-Traditional Foreign Investments Including Those Spurred on by Social Media?:  
Applying an Industry-Specific Lens to the Salini Test to Determine Article 25 Jurisdiction, 32 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 44 (2014) (describing an industry specific approach). 
 10. The most common form of this is found in Quiborax and includes removing the 
requirement that a substantial economic contribution be made to the host country. See 
Quiborax, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, ¶ 220.  The removal of this prong aligns more with 
the broader definition of investment. See infra Part I.D. 
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contemplated investment’s point of inception, exhibit a cognizable 
contribution to a host country’s economic development and (2) it must, by 
its very nature, be value creating.  In doing so, this Note argues that the 
Convention’s stated goal is one that ought to be protected. 
The ICSID Convention was drafted with a single goal in mind:  to 
increase private investment, and thereby economic development, in 
underdeveloped countries.  In furtherance of this goal, ICSID provided the 
most effective and reliable enforcement mechanism for international 
disputes currently available.  Assuming ICSID’s stated purpose should be 
respected, therefore, the availability of its superior enforcement mechanism 
should be restricted to those investments that further this objective and, at 
the very least, exclude those investments that run counter to it.  Failing to 
do so will create an obvious global moral dilemma and present 
underdeveloped countries with an even more difficult road to development.  
Indeed, some countries already have experienced as much.11  As such, this 
Note proposes that article 25 be viewed as a gatekeeper for protecting the 
aims of ICSID, and it suggests how the correct objective definition of 
article 25 can achieve this end.12 
Part I provides the necessary background material for understanding the 
function and goals of ICSID arbitration, its procedural mechanism, and the 
role precedent plays in an award.  Part II then discusses Mitchell v. 
Democratic Republic of Congo13 and Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka14 as a way of illustrating differing 
approaches to defining “investment” and how the choice of approach can be 
outcome determinative.  Finally, Part III argues that a holistic approach, 
emphasizing the Convention’s goal of economic development, is the 
remedy for article 25’s inconsistent application and one that can ensure that 
ICSID’s fantastic enforcement mechanism is made available only to those 
investors for which it was intended. 
I.  WHAT’S THE FUSS ABOUT?  A BACKGROUND  
ON THE ICSID CONVENTION, ARTICLE 25,  
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
This part provides background information that is necessary for 
determining the correct interpretation of article 25.  It begins with a 
discussion of international investment generally as a policy trigger for 
ICSID and, therefore, the greater function served by article 25.  General 
 
 11. See infra Part II.B; see also Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 301, 303–05 (2015) (explaining how “through creative treaty shopping, 
corporations can attain international legal protection for their contracts with foreign 
sovereigns” and thereby “trump[] the states’ prospective attempts to regulate in the public 
interest”). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment (Nov. 1, 2006), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0537.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG22-3A 
GE]. 
 14. ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBD7-KJHK]. 
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background information on the Convention follows, including how the 
arbitration process operates.  The general background information is then 
used to set up a more specific discussion of article 25, which is the focus of 
this Note.  Finally, this part concludes by outlining the general approaches 
tribunals have taken with respect to interpreting article 25, which, as this 
Note argues, are best viewed under two general categories. 
A.  Understanding the Risks Inherent in International Investment 
and the Purpose ICSID Serves 
In the paradigmatic international investment, a host government, 
typically of a less developed, undercapitalized country, seeks to improve the 
quality of life for its citizens15 but lacks the immediate necessary resources 
to do so.16  Foreign investors have the deep pockets and “know-how” to 
provide a solution to this dilemma, but they will not do so for free.17  Like 
any investor, a foreign investor’s ultimate goal is to generate a profit with 
the investment.18  This need for profitability is of paramount importance to 
the definition of the sovereign-investor relationship within the international 
investment context. 
Profitability19 is limited by an investment’s associated risks, and, as is the 
case with foreign investment, there is a significant risk presented by the 
inherent unpredictability of human and government conduct.20  This raises 
the question as to why a prudent investor—or a prudent host country for 
that matter—would agree to an investment in which a unilateral change of 
the host country’s policy can effectively nullify their contribution.  
However, the international investment market has created some 
countermeasures to these risks. 
“Substantive protections” have long existed to limit the impact of these 
sorts of risks.21  The most common type of substantive protection is a 1950s 
creation known as a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).22  Supplementing 
investment agreements, BITs are essentially state-to-state agreements in 
which each country agrees to protect the other’s investors.23  BITs, 
 
 15. Improvements are often in the form of infrastructure projects (i.e., roads, water, 
power plants, etc.). See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 18–19 (2013). 
 16. See id. at 18. 
 17. See id. at 18–23. 
 18. See id. at 18. 
 19. As used here, “profitability” encompasses both the host country’s expected benefit 
as well as the investor’s. 
 20. See SALACUSE, supra note 15, at 25 (“An investor may promise to build a factory in 
a country but never build it.  A host government may enact a low corporate tax rate in one 
year with the promise never to raise it, yet pass legislation to increase taxes drastically the 
day after an investor makes an investment.  It is the inherent unpredictability of human and 
government conduct that creates perceived risk for a contemplated investment.”). 
 21. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”:  ICSID’s Travaux and 
the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257, 262–63 (2010) 
(explaining the history of substantive protections in international law). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 263.  This protection, by extension, applies to their “investments.” See id. 
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however, do not enforce themselves.24  Moreover, until the 1990s, an 
investor lacking a direct cause of action would have to petition his own 
government to bring a claim on his behalf.25 
Recognizing this dilemma ex ante in the 1960s, the World Bank drafted 
the ICSID Convention26 to create a system that protects both investor and 
sovereign rights arising out of those substantive protections (assuming 
consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction), in which the investor could bring the claim 
on his own behalf.27  ICSID implicitly contemplates and attempts to 
reconcile two distinct and competing interests in its effort to increase 
“investment” abroad:  (1) a foreign government’s dual need for both capital 
and political autonomy over the use of that capital and (2) an investor’s 
desire to mitigate the added investment risks associated with the 
unpredictability of an unfamiliar government.28  Put simply, ICSID’s 
original goal was to seek to increase foreign direct investment (FDI).29 
B.  ICSID:  A “BIT” of History 
The ICSID Convention was enacted in 1965 to create a dispute resolution 
mechanism that reconciles the paradigmatic investment risks of both the 
foreign investor and host country.30  The Convention has a relatively 
straightforward framework.  Assuming both the host country and foreign 
investor consent to its jurisdiction,31 a tribunal will hear a claim, enter a 
judgment, and ensure that the judgment will be enforced.32  In a way, a 
 
 24. See id. at 262 (“The regime of international investment law is best understood as two 
interlocking pieces:  substantive protections for foreign investors combined with remedial 
procedures to enforce those protections.”). 
 25. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1521, 1536 (2005) (“[I]nvestors were forced to lobby their home country to espouse a claim 
on their behalf at the International Court of Justice . . . .”). 
 26. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 27. Of course, the ICSID Convention was actually drafted over several years. See 
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY 1 (2d ed. 2009). 
(“The Convention’s preparation took place in the years 1961 to 1965.”).  It should also be 
noted that other types of arbitration mechanisms exist in addition to ICSID. 
 28. See SALACUSE, supra note 15, at 330, 343. 
 29. See id. at 343 (explaining how the creation of ICSID was predicated on “resolving 
disputes between foreign investors and host governments because it believed that problem 
was impeding the flow of capital necessary for the development of less developed 
countries”). 
 30. See supra Part I.A; see also SALACUSE, supra note 15, at 25 (explaining how a well-
functioning legal system serves to mitigate the risks associated with the unpredictability of 
human and governmental behavior, thereby allowing investors to isolate the risks they are 
willing to accept and ensure the relative soundness of their investments). 
 31. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 25(3) (“Consent by a constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State . . . .”). 
 32. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, arts. 53–55.  In comparison to the other 
existing arbitration mechanisms (e.g., UNICTRAL and the New York Convention), ICSID 
makes it inherently more difficult for domestic courts to overturn awards because ICSID 
awards are not particularly susceptible to public policy arguments. See Mortenson, supra 
note 21, at 258, 265–66 (explaining how “[t]he great majority of countries around the world 
belong to ICSID” as a way to avail themselves of its enforcement mechanism). 
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tribunal functions similarly to the way in which a traditional court would.33  
There are, however, several key differences. 
1.  Characteristics of an ICSID Tribunal 
Tribunals are constituted on an ad hoc basis.34  Members of a given 
tribunal are typically appointed by the parties to the dispute,35 and, although 
the Convention maintains a panel from which the parties can choose their 
arbitrators,36 the parties are free “to appoint conciliators and arbitrators 
from [elsewhere].”37  It is not guaranteed, therefore, that the same group of 
arbitrators will be on more than a single tribunal together.38 
Decisions rendered by tribunals also are generated on an ad hoc basis.39  
Specifically, arbitral tribunals are not required to rely on precedent in 
making their determinations.40  Moreover, the absence of such a 
requirement extends to a tribunal’s interpretation of the ICSID 
Convention.41  Therefore, the dispute resolution mechanism that ICSID 
contemplates makes the possibility of consistent outcomes inherently 
difficult.42  Nonetheless, the Convention contains several mechanisms 
designed to mitigate concerns over consistency. 
One such mechanism is found within article 48(2)–(3).43  These 
provisions declare form and substance requirements that an award must 
satisfy.44  Expanded upon by Arbitration Rule 47,45 the three most relevant 
 
 33. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 264 (“Over time, these Tribunals have come to act 
more like formal international courts than like traditional commercial arbitrators.”). 
 34. ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 37. 
 35. See id.  An arbitral tribunal’s constitution can vary from case to case in that it can 
either “consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the 
parties shall agree.” Id.  If the parties do not agree upon a number or method for appointing 
arbitrators, however, article 37 has a default rule:  three arbitrators, whereby each party can 
designate one, and the final arbitrator is appointed pursuant to the agreement of the parties. 
Id. 
 36. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 44 (“The Panels are lists of persons who may 
act as conciliators or arbitrators.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. But see Mortenson, supra note 21, at 264 (explaining how many of the arbitrators are 
chosen from a “substantially recurring roster of experts”). 
 39. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 53(1) (requiring only that “[t]he award 
shall be binding on the parties”); see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1101 (“The 
first part of Art. 53(1) may also be read as excluding the applicability of the principle of 
binding precedent to successive ICSID cases.”). 
 40. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1101. 
 41. Compare Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 211–217 (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (wherein the arbitral tribunal applied a 
modified Salini test in its interpretation of article 25) [https://perma.cc/KB6C-XG7R], with 
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 24 (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0537.pdf (where the ad hoc committee applied the Salini test in its entirety for the same 
purpose) [https://perma.cc/JG22-3AGE]. 
 42. See Franck, supra note 25, at 1558–82 (providing a far more detailed discussion on 
inconsistent decisions). 
 43. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 48(2)–(3). 
 44. See id.  The full text of article 48 states: 
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criteria are the following:  the award must be (1) in writing, (2) exhaustive, 
and (3) reasoned.46  The latter requirement, being a “standard feature in 
contemporary international adjudication,”47 merely means that a reader 
must be able to follow the reasoning of the tribunal on both issues of law 
and fact.48 
Although this requirement is noble in its aim, the ad hoc nature of the 
tribunal’s reasoning may potentially undercut any finality the judgment may 
receive in the event of an annulment proceeding.49  This is because 
annulment committees also are constituted on an ad hoc basis,50 and, while 
precluded from reexamining the merits of the initial award,51 an annulment 
committee may nonetheless reexamine the original award’s substance under 
the auspices of procedure.52  Therefore, as was the case in Mitchell, an 
annulment committee may choose to apply an article 25 definition of 
“investment” that differs from the arbitral tribunal’s, making consistent 
treatment of the term “investment” in article 25 even more necessary.53 
As such, and in conjunction with the fact that ICSID does not require 
tribunals to rely on precedent in forming their ultimate decisions,54 it is 
 
  (1) The Tribunal shall decide questions by a majority of the votes of all its 
members. 
  (2) The award of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by the 
members of the Tribunal who voted for it. 
  (3) The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and 
shall state the reasons upon which it is based. 
  (4) Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, 
whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent. 
  (5) The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. 
Id. art. 48. 
 45. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 812 (“The information to be included in an 
award is set out in more detail in [Rule 47 of] the Arbitration Rules.”). 
 46. See id.  Essentially, arbitral tribunals are required to justify their decisions in a 
similar fashion to the way in which an American judge would write an opinion. See, e.g., 
Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/02, Award (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1272.pdf (providing a lengthy justification for the enforcement of a 
hedging agreement) [https://perma.cc/FX48-UZLW]. 
 47. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 819 (noting how this requirement is similar to 
other contemporary means of international adjudication, including the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice and its rules, in the International Law Commission’s 1958 
Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, and in the International Chamber of Commerce’s 1998 
Rules of Arbitration). 
 48. See id. at 820. 
 49. See infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion on the annulment proceeding process. 
 50. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 51. It should be noted that there is no appeals process provided for in the ICSID 
Convention.  Rather, there is an annulment process in its place. See ICSID Convention, 
supra note 26, art. 52. 
 52. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 821; see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 53. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 54. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Uneasy Role of Precedent in Defining Investment 6 
(Univ. Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 344, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286376&download=yes (explaining 
how precedent has an uncertain place within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
for which tribunals are required to follow) [https://perma.cc/V6LL-PCTT]; see also 
SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1101 (“Nothing in the Convention’s travaux 
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clear that consistent interpretation of the Convention is vital for an ICSID 
award to be given the effect of finality. 
2.  The Annulment Process and Article 52:  
Is It a Procedural Check on Justice 
or Is It an Opportunity for Inconsistent Administration of Justice? 
Article 52 of the Convention governs annulment proceedings.55  Similar 
to that of an appellate mechanism, the annulment process provides a 
procedural check on an initial tribunal’s award.56  Of primary significance 
to this Note, however, is the effect that this mechanism can have on an 
arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the definition of “investment” under 
article 25.  This effect, however, is best understood through a discussion on 
the ways in which an article 52 annulment proceeding differs from that of a 
typical appeal. 
An annulment proceeding is distinct from that of an appeal in several 
ways.  First, it differs in terms of the result that it provides.57  Unlike an 
appeal that modifies a decision, an annulment can only serve to reject or 
accept a decision.58  Therefore, parties are free to resubmit their claims after 
an annulment determination is made.59  This renders res judicata 
inapplicable.60 
A second distinction is rooted in article 52’s purpose.  In particular, 
article 52 balances the two “potentially conflicting” principles of finality 
and correctness.61  Article 52 resolves this conflict in favor of finality 
because, in international arbitration, the principle of finality is seen as 
having much greater priority over correctness.62  As such, a more limited 
review process is preferred63 and is restricted to five possible grounds.64  Of 
 
préparatoires suggests that a doctrine of stare decisis should be applied to ICSID 
arbitration.”).  Nonetheless, tribunals and ad hoc committees will frequently “refer to and 
rely on previous decisions,” simultaneously acknowledging that they are not bound by them. 
Id.; see also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 76 (Nov. 14, 2005), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0074.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW9Y-
RYG9]. 
 55. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 52. 
 56. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 821. 
 57. See id. at 901.  The main difference, with respect to process, is that the result of a 
successful annulment “is the invalidation of the original decision,” whereas “[t]he result of a 
successful appeal is its modification.” Id.  An annulment proceeding, therefore, has only two 
possible outcomes:  void the original decision or leave it in tact. See id.  Res judicata, 
therefore, would only apply to the latter. See id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 903 (“It is designed to provide emergency relief for egregious violations of 
a few basic principles while preserving the finality of the decision in most respects.”). 
 62. See id. (“Ad hoc committees have emphasized that the annulment process is 
concerned with the ‘process of decision’ or ‘whether the manner in which the Tribunal 
carried out its functions met the requirements of the ICSID Convention.’”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. The five grounds include: 
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
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those grounds the two most significant for article 25 purposes are “failure to 
state reasons”65 and when “the Tribunal manifestly exceed[s] its powers.”66  
By extension, therefore, this includes failing to exercise jurisdiction under 
article 25 where jurisdiction exists.67  Accordingly, annulment on these 
grounds may be due to inconsistent application of the Salini test.68 
Finally, article 52 specifies that an annulment committee must be ad 
hoc.69  Unlike the arbitral tribunal, however, annulment committee 
members are not chosen by the parties but are appointed by ICSID.70  One 
might argue that this allows for a more objective review process because the 
committee is unlikely to have ties to the parties.71  When considered in 
conjunction with the rest of the provision, however, it is clear that an 
annulment committee disagreeing with an arbitral tribunal’s interpretation 
of “investment” for purposes of determining article 25 jurisdiction can 
effectively substitute its own definition.72  Indeed, this has happened 
before.73  As such, consensus on the correct interpretation of an article 25 
“investment” is all the more necessary. 
For the annulment process to effectively function as a procedural check 
on justice, there must be consistent and fair treatment of article 25.  The 
 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or  
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 52. 
 65. This specifically refers to Arbitration Rule 47’s “reasons” requirement. See supra 
note 46 and accompanying text. 
 66. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 947. 
 67. Id.  This is in light of the fact that there are, as stated, several “accepted” forms of 
the article 25 test for an “investment.” See infra Part I.C. 
 68. The most significant example of this is found in Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of 
Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 24 (Nov. 1, 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0537.pdf (where the ad hoc 
committee annulled the initial tribunal’s definition of “investment” pursuant to differing 
views on whether the Salini test ought to be applied) [https://perma.cc/JG22-3AGE]. 
 69. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 52(3) (“On receipt of the request [for an 
Annulment proceeding] the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators 
an ad hoc Committee of three persons.”). 
 70. See id.  This approach has its pros and cons.  In fact, at least one commentator 
believes the absence of party-appointed arbitrators makes the committee “less attractive to 
the parties.” SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1029.  “On the other hand, their distance to 
the parties gives a higher probability of complete objectivity of every single member and a 
better basis for rational cooperation among members.” Id. 
 71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 86 (July 3, 2002), 19 ICSID REV. 89 (2004) 
(explaining how “the failure by a Tribunal to exercise a jurisdiction given it by the ICSID 
Convention . . . in circumstances where the outcome of the inquiry is affected as a result” is 
a “manifest excess of powers within the meaning of Article 52(1)(b)”). 
 73. See, e.g., Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶¶ 24, 38 (determining that the 
arbitral tribunal’s finding of jurisdiction was inadequate as it was the result of mere 
deference to the relevant BIT and a failure to consider any objective criteria underlying 
article 25). 
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problem is that article 25, by its very nature74 and in conjunction with the 
rest of the Convention, makes achieving this goal fairly difficult. 
3.  Accessing Arbitration:  
What Is an “Investment” Under Article 25 of the Convention? 
To access ICSID arbitration, in addition to consenting to jurisdiction,75 
an investor must satisfy several explicit “preconditions” under article 25 of 
the ICSID Convention before a tribunal will consider the merits of a 
particular claim.76  These preconditions pertain to (1) the nature of the 
dispute (the ratione materiae) and (2) the parties (the ratione personae).77 
Of these preconditions, the ratione materiae is of paramount importance 
and is the focal point of this Note.  Specifically, article 25 states that “[t]he 
jurisdiction of [ICSID] shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment.”78  Article 25 of the Convention, however, fails to provide 
any explicit definition of “investment.”79  While some have suggested that 
those drafting the Convention deemed such a definition unworthy of 
consideration,80 a definition of the term was provided for in earlier drafts.81  
As such, there is very little in the Convention that suggests any sort of 
objective meaning of the term.82  Moreover, outside of the drafters’ 
 
 74. See infra Part I.E. 
 75. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 76. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 83 (“While consent of the parties is an 
essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring 
a dispute within its jurisdiction.  In keeping with the purpose of the Convention, the 
jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited by reference to the nature of the dispute and the 
parties thereto.” (quoting Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965, 1 
ICSID Rep. 23, 28 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Executive Directors])). 
 77. See id. at 82. 
 78. ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 25(1) (emphasis added). 
 79. See id., art. 25; SCHREUER ET AL, supra note 27, at 114 (“[T]he Convention does not 
offer any definition or even description of this basic term.”). But see Mortenson, supra note 
21, at 316 (“If commentators agree on anything in this area, it is that pure trade transactions 
should not be subject to ICSID jurisdiction.  (This is despite the fact that drafting attempts to 
exclude ‘commercial’ assets and transactions were all rejected.)” (footnote omitted)). 
 80. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 51 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) (stating that “such a 
definition had seemed unnecessary to the representatives of the States that negotiated it”). 
 81. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 114–15 (explaining how earlier drafts of the 
Convention included definitions of the term).  Moreover, it is well documented that the first 
draft of the ICSID Convention defined “investment” in strikingly similar terms to those 
expounded in the Salini test. See id.; see also Mortenson, supra note 21, at 297–99 
(discussing the similarities of this draft to the Salini test).  Specifically, the first draft of the 
Convention defined “investment” as “any contribution of money or other asset of economic 
value for an indefinite period or, if the period be defined, for not less than five years.” 1 
ICSID, HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 116 (1970).  Similarly, in Salini, the tribunal 
includes contribution and duration as two of its four factors. See Salini, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, ¶ 52 (“[I]nvestment infers:  contributions, a certain duration of performance of 
the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction.”). 
 82. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 113. 
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distinction between “investment” and “commercial activity,”83 the only 
evidence of any sort of objective meaning for the term is found within the 
Convention’s preamble and the accompanying Report of the Executive 
Directors.84  Both suggest that “investment” should include a contribution 
to economic development.85  Whether this language is a clear requirement 
for purposes of determining article 25 jurisdiction is the subject of 
considerable debate86 and is addressed further in Parts II and III of this 
Note. 
By virtue of a lack of legal precedent, article 25 necessarily consists of a 
dynamic interpretive element.87  Accordingly, consistent interpretation 
appears necessary to foster predictable and equitable outcomes.88  
Underlying this concern is the consent requirement. 
4.  A “BIT” of Consent:  
A Second Definition of Investment That Also Must Be Satisfied 
Article 25’s consent requirement89 compounds the confusion surrounding 
the definition of “investment.”  ICSID protection is only available if both 
the host country and the investor consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction90 and only 
if such consent is provided for in one of three ways:  (1) through a contract 
between the investor and host state, (2) “through a provision in the host 
State’s investment legislation that has been accepted by the investor,” or (3) 
through treaty language.91  Most current ICSID arbitration arises out of the 
latter two.92  Of primary concern to this Note however, are BITs, which 
provide the most common way for parties to obtain consent.93  Although 
 
 83. See id. at 98 (explaining how article 25’s expression “dispute of a legal character” 
was meant to exclude “commercial claims”); see also Mortenson, supra note 21, at 298–99. 
 84. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 116–17 (“The only possible indication of an 
objective meaning that can be gleaned from the Convention is contained in the Preamble’s 
first sentence, which speaks of ‘the need for international co-operation for economic 
development and the role of private international investment therein.’”); Report of the 
Executive Directors, supra note 76, at 25 (explaining how the Convention was motivated by 
“the desire to strengthen the partnership between countries in the cause of economic 
development”). 
 85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 86. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 117. 
 87. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 309–10 (“To say that the definition of ‘investment’ 
has been contentious is an understatement . . . .”). 
 88. See infra Parts II–III. 
 89. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 25(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment . . . which the parties to 
the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.” (emphasis added)). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 119 (listing the three ways in which consent 
may be given). 
 92. Id. at 192 (stating that recently, consent is usually “expressed through treaties and 
legislation”). 
 93. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 262 (referring to BITs as “the dominant component 
of international investment law”).  It is worth noting that BITs often provide for a host 
country’s consent by way of an “umbrella clause,” which is a broad provision that insulates 
an “investor from breach of any agreements entered into with the host state,” including 
investment agreements not yet entered into. See Arato, supra note 11, at 321.  An umbrella 
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BITs are not discussed much in the preparatory works accompanying the 
Convention,94 hundreds of BITs now incorporate ICSID clauses.95  
Therefore, a jurisdictionally sufficient dispute typically also must arise out 
of the definition of “investment” as provided for in the relevant BIT 
language. 
Taking the consent requirement into account then, there are two steps that 
a claimant must satisfy for their “investment” to qualify for ICSID 
arbitration.  The first requirement, as stated, is that the dispute must arise 
out of an “investment” as defined in the relevant treaty or contract.  
Secondly, the claim must arise out of an “investment” consistent with 
article 25.96  Collectively, both steps form the “double keyhole” approach.97 
Although the latter step is the focal point of this Note, both are 
interconnected, with the former step presenting difficulties of its own.  In 
particular, although an “investment” typically is defined within a particular 
BIT, the same definition is not necessarily shared by other BITs.98  More 
importantly, even if BITs do share the same definition, this does not mean 
that they are reflective of the Convention’s notion of “investment.”99  This 
underscores a fundamental characteristic of BITs:  they are freely drafted 
agreements between two states.100  As such, the parties may choose to 
define an “investment” as virtually anything, and, so long as the dispute 
arises out of an activity that falls under that definition, ICSID’s consent 
requirement would be satisfied.101 
As one might infer, article 25 serves as an outer limit on the type of 
“investment” that parties may consent to for purposes of ICSID 
jurisdiction.102 
C.  Tribunals’ Approaches to Interpreting 
an Article 25 “Investment” 
As explained in Part I, tribunals have approached the interpretation of 
article 25 “investment” in two primary ways.  The first, and most 
traditional, approach involves deferring to the relevant BIT language and its 
definition of the term.103  The second approach is more restrictive and 
 
clause’s ex ante nature makes BITs incredibly powerful, as “Tribunals have interpreted 
[them] as effectively internationalizing state contracts.” Id. 
 94. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 205 (explaining how there was little reference 
made to BITs in the travaux préparatoires to the Convention). 
 95. Id. at 206. 
 96. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 97. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 117. 
 98. It should be noted, however, that most definitions of “investment” found within BITs 
are remarkably similar. See id. at 122–25. 
 99. See id. at 124 (explaining that “if a BIT’s definition of investment goes beyond the 
requirements of the ICSID Convention there will be no jurisdiction”). 
 100. See SALACUSE, supra note 15, at 342. 
 101. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 124. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 269. 
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involves applying an objective test that was first stated in Salini.104  Finally, 
tribunals occasionally will modify the Salini test.105 
1.  Deference 
Traditionally, tribunals have taken an approach that can be considered 
deferential to the language chosen by the parties to a dispute.  Emphasizing 
the parties’ intentions, tribunals will look at the language of consent (i.e., 
the definition found within the relevant BIT) given by the parties to the 
dispute and, so long as the written agreement recognizes the activity or 
asset in question as an investment106 and does not include single 
commercial transactions,107 defer to it.108 
2.  Salini 
The Salini test—and its variations109—function as an objective test with 
several indicia used to determine whether an “investment” exists for 
purposes of satisfying article 25.110  In its original form, the test was 
satisfied if four factors were present:  (1) contributions, (2) a certain 
duration of performance of the contract, (3) participation in the risks of the 
transaction, and (4) contribution to the economic development of the host 
state.111 
Although this test obtained notoriety by way of the Salini award, the 
sitting tribunal in that case listed the above factors with minimal 
justification112 and was satisfied that the claim before it did, in fact, arise 
out of an article 25 “investment.”113  Moreover, with the exception of one 
case,114 awards preceding Salini involved mostly mechanical deference to 
 
 104. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 129. 
 105. See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 211–217 (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (applying only 
three of the Salini factors) [https://perma.cc/KB6C-XG7R]. 
 106. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 269 (“Some Tribunals following the deferential 
approach have come close to rendering the definition of investment nonjusticiable, asserting 
that it simply merges with the question of party consent.”); see also Gruslin v. Malaysia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, ¶¶ 13.5–.6 (Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2006). 
 107. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 269 (“[M]ost have agreed that a single commercial 
transaction (such as the delivery of a single load of cars) would be outside the scope of the 
Convention . . . .”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 110. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 129. 
 111. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003). 
 112. Id. (explaining that the criteria were based on previous awards that had denied 
jurisdiction on the grounds that an “investment” did not exist, as well as the Convention’s 
preamble). 
 113. Id. ¶¶ 52–58. 
 114. See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 34–36 (July 11, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998).  Specifically, this was the first 
case in which jurisdiction was denied for failure to satisfy article 25’s definition of 
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the relevant BIT’s definition of “investment,”115 making the fact that this 
test was first articulated in Salini all the more surprising.  Nonetheless, it 
has become the standard from which most tribunals begin their analysis, 
regardless of whether they ultimately choose to apply it.116 
3.  Modified Salini 
Other tribunals have taken approaches that remove117 or add118 one or 
more of the Salini factors.  Removal is more common, especially of the 
“contribution to economic development” prong.119  In removing or adding 
criteria, the tribunal may apply either a broader or more restrictive 
definition of “investment.” 
D.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and Its Effect on ICSID Tribunals’ Procedure 
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, commonly known as “the 
Vienna Convention,” plays a vital role in tribunals’ ability to interpret 
treaties, including the articles of the ICSID Convention. 
According to article 31 of the Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.”120  Utilizing this framework, there are “three lines of 
reasoning that are ‘conceivable’ in the context of investment treaties.”121  
The first is to give meaning to the “object and purpose” of the treaty.122  
This may be accomplished, for example, by focusing on a treaty’s 
 
“investment,” and it was the award from which the Salini Tribunal gleaned its criteria. See 
Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, ¶ 52 (discussing Fedax). 
 115. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 259 (explaining that “[h]istorically, Tribunals took 
a highly deferential approach” in determining whether there was a jurisdictionally sufficient 
investment). 
 116. See Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention:  A 
Defense of Salini, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287, 295 (2014) (“[E]ven arbitral boards that end up 
modifying the test regularly use it as the starting point from which to base their analysis, 
which demonstrates that the test has gained no small degree of legitimacy.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 211–217 (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (applying only 
three of the Salini factors) [https://perma.cc/KB6C-XG7R]. 
 118. See, e.g., Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award, ¶ 100 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0668.pdf (adding a requirement that the investment be “bona fide”) [https://perma.cc/ 
N89R-BPD3]. 
 119. See, e.g., Quiborax, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, ¶¶ 211–218. 
 120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 121. Joseph M. Boddicker, Whose Dictionary Controls?:  Recent Challenges to the Term 
“Investment” in ICSID Arbitration, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1031, 1044 n.84 (2014) 
(quoting Rudolf Dolzer, The Notion of Investment in Recent Practice, in LAW IN THE SERVICE 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 261, 272 (Steve 
Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005)). 
 122. See id. at 1044. 
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preamble.123  The second way is to emphasize the ordinary meaning of the 
treaty’s language with little regard to the treaty’s “object and purpose.”124  
Third, treaty language may be interpreted in a way that narrowly limits the 
sovereignty of the states in question—termed in dubio mitius.125  If, 
however, an article 31 construction yields an ambiguous result, article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention allows tribunals to consider the preparatory work 
surrounding the treaty in question.126 
E.  Ambiguous?:  Applying the Vienna Convention:  
Tribunals’ Approaches to Article 25 That Encompass  
the “Contribution to Economic Development” and Those That Do Not 
Applying the Vienna Convention to the jurisdictional tests outlined in 
Part I.C, there are really only two categorical approaches for determining 
the existence of an article 25 investment that matter with respect to this 
Note:  those approaches that include the requirement that an investment 
contribute to the economic development of the host country and those that 
do not. 
Application turns on whether “investment” is deemed ambiguous for 
purposes of the Vienna Convention—if a tribunal treats the term as 
ambiguous, it cannot take the position that the word should be given its 
ordinary meaning.127  Moreover, if a tribunal cannot arrive at a given term’s 
meaning by way of the remaining interpretive techniques found within 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention, it must apply the Vienna Convention’s 
rules for interpreting ambiguous terms under article 32, including 
consideration of preparatory documents and preambles.128  Consequently, 
of all the article 25 criteria that various tribunals have chosen to utilize, 
“contribution to economic development” is the only criterion that actually 
has internal justification found within the ICSID Convention and its 
preparatory works, and it is the only criterion that does not arise out of an 
attempt to determine the term’s “ordinary meaning.”129 
Reconsidering the approaches discussed in Part I.C helps to clarify this 
distinction. 
1.  Revisiting the Traditional Approach 
The traditional deferential approach encompasses no objective definition 
of “investment” whatsoever.130  By deferring to the parties’ consent, this 
approach implicitly rests on the notion that “investment” is clearly defined 
 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See VCLT, supra note 120, arts. 31–32. 
 127. See supra Part I.D (explaining how one of the three approaches a tribunal can take 
when interpreting terms under the Vienna Convention includes giving the term its ordinary 
meaning). 
 128. See supra Part I.D. 
 129. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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by the ICSID Convention and that its meaning should be gleaned only by 
the parties’ written consent.131  As such, this approach deems the term 
unambiguous, thereby not requiring a contribution to economic 
development. 
It should be noted, however, that other deferential approaches might 
recognize the existence of ambiguity and yet fail to apply the contribution 
to economic development requirement.132  Adherents to this approach 
believe that such was the goal of the Convention and that the goal is distinct 
from a jurisdictional requirement.133 
2.  Revisiting the Modified Approach 
In Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia,134 the tribunal justified 
its application of the three Salini factors (i.e., contribution, duration, and 
risk) on the ground that the factors encompassed the “ordinary meaning” of 
“investment,” believing that this is what the term, as laid out in the 
Convention, was intended to convey.135  This “modified” Salini approach, 
therefore, effectively contemplates an unambiguous definition of the term 
and, as such, also excludes the “contribution to economic development” 
requirement. 
3.  Revisiting Salini 
In Salini, the same criteria used in Quiborax (i.e., contribution, duration, 
and risk) were justified on different grounds.  Specifically, the tribunal 
 
 131. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 132. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 300–01, 309–10 (articulating a broad deferential 
test premised on the parties’ consented-to definition of “investment” so as to include any 
“plausibly economic activity or asset,” all the while recognizing the ambiguity that the term 
presents); see also SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 134 (distinguishing between the 
purpose of encouraging economic development and a jurisdictional requirement of such). 
 133. See Victor Pey Casado and Presidente Allende Found. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/2, Award, ¶ 232 (May 8, 2008) (explaining that the reference to economic 
development in the preamble was intended to be a consequence as opposed to a condition of 
the investment). 
 134. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KB6C-XG7R]. 
 135. See id. ¶ 212 (taking the position that the “ICSID Convention intended to give to the 
term ‘investment’ an ‘ordinary meaning’ as opposed to a ‘special meaning’”).  It is also 
worth noting that in Quiborax, the tribunal’s justification rests on an incorrect reading of the 
Vienna Convention.  Specifically, the tribunal relied on the Vienna Convention’s mandate 
that words be given their ordinary meaning. See VCLT, supra note 120, art. 31(1).  What the 
tribunal failed to consider, however, is that the term “investment” as it exists within the 
Convention is, by most accounts, ambiguous and without ordinary meaning. See Mortenson, 
supra note 21, at 309–10 (noting that “drafting history remains relevant and potentially 
decisive for any colorably contentious problem of construction” and that, with respect to the 
definition of investment offered by the Convention’s three authoritative languages, “it would 
be disingenuous to pretend they are unambiguous”).  Because the ICSID Convention’s text 
and its supporting documents at least arguably suggest that there be a cognizable 
“contribution to economic development,” this is the only currently available criterion that is 
consistent with accepting the term as ambiguous. 
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recognized them as a byproduct of ICSID “precedent.”136  Moreover, the 
contribution to economic development was gleaned from the preamble, 
therefore implicitly recognizing the ambiguity of the term “investment.”  
Therefore, the tribunal in Salini (and its subsequent adherents) recognized 
that “investment” is an ambiguous term as used in the ICSID Convention.  
Approaches adding requirements to the Salini test are similar in that they 
too fall under the category of approach that deems the word “ambiguous” 
and thereby include the contribution to economic development criterion.137 
II.  TRIBUNALS, AD HOC COMMITTEES, 
AND INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 25 
This part begins with a discussion of two awards:  the annulment 
proceeding in Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo138 and the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision in Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka.139  Because each decision is predicated on an interpretation of 
article 25 that directly conflicts with the other (specifically, their respective 
treatment of the contribution to economic development prong), this 
discussion illustrates the two divergent views on article 25’s objective 
requirement for an “investment” and how the outcome of a given award 
depends on a tribunal’s chosen approach.  In discussing each decision, this 
part considers each respective tribunal’s level of deference to the relevant 
BIT language, their utilization of ICSID “precedent,”140 and their 
consideration of the Convention’s stated object and purpose.  Discussion of 
each award is followed by the positions of those commentators, scholars, 
and tribunals who agree and disagree with each approach. 
A.  Mitchell v. Congo:  
Finding That an Article 25 Investment Should Contribute 
to the Development of a Host Country’s Economy 
Mitchell is, at least factually, a fairly straightforward case.  Patrick 
Mitchell, an American lawyer, opened a law office in the Democratic 
 
 136. See supra note 114.  This Note does not address whether “ICSID precedent” is 
viable justification for a tribunal’s approach to defining an article 25 “investment.”  
Nonetheless, it is essential that one recognize the difference between the justifications used 
by the tribunals in Quiborax and Salini, respectively, as one tribunal implicitly recognizes 
the term as ambiguous, and the other tribunal treats the term as unambiguous. 
 137. Arguments can be made for many of the criteria used by tribunals, and an 
investment’s characteristics can be disputed indefinitely, with many compelling arguments 
made on both sides.  They are not, however, the focus of this Note.  This Note instead 
focuses on the only criterion that is meant to apply to the Convention’s definition of the term 
in the event of ambiguity. 
 138. ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment (Nov. 1, 2006), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0537.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG22-3A 
GE]. 
 139. ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX48-UZLW]. 
 140. As previously stated, although ICSID tribunals are not required to rely on previous 
awards rendered by tribunals, they nonetheless do so, in particular when performing an 
article 25 analysis. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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Republic of the Congo (DRC).141  After several years, however, the 
Congolese government, suspicious of Mitchell, shut down his operation.142  
In response, Mitchell brought an ICSID claim against the Congolese 
government for damages resulting from this intrusion via the protection 
afforded by the United States-Congo BIT.143  The arbitral tribunal, failing 
to apply the Salini test and instead choosing to defer to the definition of 
“investment” as provided for in the US-Congo BIT,144 determined that 
Mitchell’s law office qualified as an “investment” for article 25 purposes 
and subsequently issued an award in Mitchell’s favor.145  The ad hoc 
annulment committee disagreed. 
The annulment committee, while briefly referencing the four Salini 
elements,146 emphasized one criterion in particular:  contribution to a host 
country’s economic development.147  In doing so, the committee stressed 
the purposes and aims of the ICSID Convention.148  True to the traditional 
Salini approach,149 the committee reasoned that because the preamble 
explicitly “consider[s] the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein,”150 
Mitchell’s operation must either contribute in some way to the host 
country’s economic development or at least encompass the “the interests of 
the State” if it were to qualify for ICSID arbitration.151 
Contrary to the arbitral tribunal’s finding, the ad hoc committee 
determined that Mitchell’s operation accomplished neither objective and 
that the firm—as described within the initial award—lacked a cognizable 
connection to the DRC.152  Consistent with their reliance on the 
 
 141. See Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶ 48.  Some of his work included 
providing counsel to foreign investors, suggesting that he likely advised them to structure 
their investments in ways that were potentially deleterious to the Congolese government. See 
id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 52 (acknowledging, although disagreeing, with the Congolese position in that 
the seizure of Mitchell’s property was justified for reasons related to the security of the 
DRC). 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. ¶¶ 40–43 (choosing instead to apply a broad deferential approach for determining 
the existence of an article 25 investment by deferring to the BIT’s definition of the term). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. ¶ 27. 
 147. See id. ¶ 33 (“The ad hoc Committee wishes nevertheless to specify that, in its view, 
the existence of a contribution to the economic development of the host State as an 
essential . . . characteristic . . . of [an] investment.”). 
 148. Id. ¶ 28 (“The Preamble of the Washington Convention sets forth a number of basic 
principles as to its purpose and aims, which imbue the individual provisions of the 
Convention, including Article 25, which makes it needless to mention that the Convention 
was concluded under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development itself.”). 
 149. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003) (discussing the 
contribution to economic development prong). 
 150. Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶ 28 (quoting the preamble).  Moreover, this is 
consistent with the Vienna Convention’s treatment of ambiguous terms under its own article 
32. See supra Part I.D. 
 151. See Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶ 39. 
 152. Id. 
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Convention’s preamble, the committee explained that, because the 
investment in question was one of services, qualification under article 25 
necessarily required that Mitchell demonstrate that he “concretely assisted 
the DRC, for example by providing it with legal services in a regular 
manner or by specifically bringing investors,”153 and that Mitchell failed in 
this respect.154  Specifically, the committee explained that the physical 
location of the offices and the money Mitchell invested were ancillary to the 
operation’s function.155  Granting jurisdiction to this claim, they reasoned, 
would necessarily create “a risk of genuine abuses, to the extent that it boils 
down to granting the qualification as investor to any legal counseling firm 
or law firm established in a foreign country, thereby enabling it to take 
advantage of the special arbitration system of ICSID.”156 
Moreover, the committee, in critiquing the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning, 
emphasized the importance of a territorial nexus in relation to a services 
investment, noting that 
[t]he [initial] Award is incomplete and obscure as regards [to] what it 
considers an investment:  it refers to various fragments of the operation, 
without finally indicating the reasons why it regards it overall as an 
investment, that is, without providing the slightest explanation as to the 
relationship between the “Mitchell & Associates” firm and the DRC.157 
This underscores an important distinction that tribunals (and ad hoc 
annulment committees) must make when performing an article 25 analysis.  
As this committee articulated, determining the existence of an investment 
necessarily requires that the tribunal distinguish between “the economic 
operation or project” and the “rights and assets protected by the Treaty 
because they are part of the operation or project, or concern the same in one 
way or another.”158  In essence, an asset or activity that is ancillary to an 
investment may have a territorial nexus to a given state, while the 
investment itself might not. 
 
 153. Id. at ¶ 38–39 (explaining how it is the services that would or would not qualify as 
an investment, not the office’s physical location). 
 154. Id. ¶ 39.  It is also worth noting that both parties to the dispute did, in fact, agree that 
Mitchell provided consultation to foreign investors. Id.  Arguably, this might have been 
viewed as satisfying the ad hoc committee’s requirement.  Nonetheless, as the committee 
went on to explain, this information was excluded from the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning and 
spoke to the merits of the case (something article 52 precludes them from reconsidering). Id.  
It thereby gave rise to an absence of reasons sufficient for annulment under article 52. See 
supra Part I.B.2.  Moreover, even if one were to find the committee’s decision unjust (in the 
moral sense of the word), its basis was no different than the dismissal of an otherwise 
meritorious claim in the U.S. legal system on procedural grounds.  Nonetheless, had the 
information concerning Mitchell’s consultation of foreign investors been included, his claim 
still would have failed.  As the committee went on to explain, Mitchell placed all of his 
proceeds in a U.S. bank account. Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶ 44 (“[B]y removing 
his income from [DRC’s] tax system he ‘knowingly and voluntarily acted against’ DRC’s 
development.”). 
 155. Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶¶ 38–39. 
 156. Id. ¶ 40. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.¶ 38. 
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In this particular case, the committee, by making such a distinction, put 
to rest potential questions regarding, for example, the firm’s office or 
Mitchell’s personal capital expenditures.159  In the committee’s own words: 
In this case, by the nature of things, it is the services of the “Mitchell & 
Associates” firm that would or would not constitute the investment within 
the meaning of the Convention and the Treaty . . . that Mr. Patrick 
Mitchell made with a view to establishing and exercising his profession in 
the DRC.  It is true that the latter would be protected by the Treaty, but 
because it related to the operation or project constituting the investment.  
However, nothing is said in the Award about the content of the services of 
the “Mitchell & Associates” firm that would justify the decision to qualify 
them as an investment.160 
Thus, in the committee’s view, when it comes to a services contract, 
establishing a physical presence within a host state, such as by maintaining 
an office, is not itself sufficient for determining a jurisdictional nexus. 
This decision, therefore, illustrates a somewhat holistic approach to an 
article 25 “investment” analysis, which is consistent with the spirit of the 
Convention.  Although it did not say so outright,161 the committee focused 
its analysis heavily on the single criterion that is justified by the text of the 
Convention (specifically, its preamble) instead of giving equal weight to 
each of the Salini elements.162 
B.  Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka:  Why Economic Development 
Is Not Necessary for Purposes of Satisfying Article 25 
The dispute in Deutsche Bank163 arose out of a one-year oil hedging 
agreement (concluded in 2008) between Deutsche Bank and Sri Lanka’s 
national petroleum corporation, Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC).164  
The terms of the agreement included a strike price of $112.50 per barrel of 
oil and applied to a strike volume of 100,000 barrels of oil.165  Payments 
were to be made every fourteen days.166  In essence, if the average price of 
oil exceeded $112.50 for a given fourteen-day period, Deutsche Bank 
would pay Sri Lanka for that difference in price.167  Alternatively, if the 
 
 159. See id.  The annulment committee also rejected the arbitral tribunal’s inclusion of 
“non-reinvested” returns as evidence of an investment. See id. ¶ 43. 
 160. Id. ¶ 38 (emphasis added). 
 161. The committee did, in fact, adhere strictly to Salini. See id. ¶ 33 (noting how the 
“contribution to the economic development” criterion is not itself “sufficient” for 
determining the existence of an article 25 investment). 
 162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 163. Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/02, Award (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1272.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX48-UZLW]. 
 164. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.  It is also worth noting that Sri Lanka owned 100 percent of the 
corporation. See id. ¶ 13. 
 165. Id. ¶ 30. 
 166. Id. 
 167. For example, if the average price of oil was $132.50 for a given fourteen days, 
Deutsche Bank would have to pay Sri Lanka $2 million for that period of time 
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price were lower than $112.50, Sri Lanka would make a payment to 
Deutsche Bank.168 
At the time the agreement was entered into, the price of oil stood at 
$137.52 per barrel (peaking at $140.24).169  Contrary to what Sri Lanka had 
hoped, however, only the first payment under this agreement was profitable 
for them,170 occurring in September of 2008 and in the amount of 
$35,523.81.171  Shortly thereafter, the price of oil dropped dramatically and 
Sri Lanka found itself making two payments of $1,659,636.36 and 
$4,507,857.14.172  In December, Sri Lanka (by extension of the CPC) 
terminated the agreement, thereby prompting Deutsche Bank, via the 
German-Sri Lanka BIT, to bring an ICSID claim against them.173  The 
arbitral tribunal determined that the hedging agreement satisfied the 
definition of investment both within the meaning of the BIT and article 25 
and issued an award in Deutsche Bank’s favor.174 
In finding for Deutsche Bank and determining that the hedging 
agreement was an investment within the meaning of article 25, the tribunal 
effectively rejected the traditional Salini test.  Specifically, the tribunal, like 
in Quiborax only utilized three of the Salini factors:  (1) substantial 
commitment or contribution, (2) duration, and (3) assumption of risk.175  
The tribunal rejected both the contribution to economic development and 
the regularity of profit and return factors, citing recent ICSID case law as its 
justification.176 
In spite of the fact that the hedging agreement involved no contribution 
of capital or resources, the tribunal determined that, by committing to pay 
Sri Lanka for the difference in market price and strike price of oil 
(assuming the price of oil exceeded the strike price, a figure that was 
capped at $2.5 million), Deutsche Bank satisfied the “contribution” 
requirement.177  The fact that the contribution was, by its very nature, 
contingent upon prices determined by a market over which neither party 
exercised control did not affect the outcome.178 
The tribunal next determined that the remaining two criteria were also 
satisfied.179  The tribunal noted that the “duration” criterion was flexible180 
 
($132.50 − $112.50 = $20 ($20 more than the strike price), and $20 × 100,000 = $2,000,000, 
where the figure is calculated on the basis of 100,000 barrels of oil). 
 168. See Deutsche Bank, ARB/09/02, ¶ 30. 
 169. Id. ¶ 28. 
 170. See id. ¶¶ 37–44. 
 171. Id. ¶ 37. 
 172. Id. ¶ 38. 
 173. See id. ¶¶ 41–44.  It is also worth noting that Deutsche first brought a claim in Sri 
Lanka’s national court system. See id. ¶¶ 45–50. 
 174. See id. ¶¶ 283–348. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. ¶¶ 297–300. 
 178. See id. ¶¶ 323–346 (taking the position that the hedging transaction was more than 
speculation and that hedging agreements are permissible under article 25 of the Convention). 
 179. See id. ¶¶ 301–304. 
 180. See id. ¶ 303. 
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and that a year-long contract (as contemplated by the agreement) was 
sufficient to establish as much.181  The tribunal determined that the “risk” 
requirement was satisfied based on the fact that Deutsche Bank risked 
losing $2.5 million.182 
In rejecting the contribution to economic development factor,183 the 
tribunal deemed it “unworkable owing to its subjective nature.”184  The 
tribunal also stressed that “the existence of an investment must be assessed 
at its inception and not with hindsight”185 and that “whether or not a 
commitment of capital or resources ultimately proves to have contributed to 
the economic development of the host State can often be a matter of 
appreciation and can generate a wide spectrum of reasonable opinions.”186 
Almost in complete opposition to the approach applied in Mitchell, the 
tribunal in Deutsche Bank utilized a broad, investor-centric interpretation of 
“investment,” relying only on the elements of contribution, risk, and 
duration.  Moreover, in so doing, the tribunal determined that the most 
significant quality of an investment is an investor’s commitment, 
independent of its effect (intended or otherwise).187 
C.  Support for the Approach in Mitchell 
(as Opposed to Deutsche Bank) 
As explained in Part I.B.3, it is the source of considerable debate as to 
whether there exists an objective article 25 definition of “investment.”188  
Whether such a definition encompasses the requirement that an investment 
contribute to the host country’s economic development is the source of even 
further contention.189  Nevertheless, many tribunals, as the ad hoc 
committee in Mitchell explained, answer both questions affirmatively by 
rejecting arguments like those found in Deutsche Bank, finding such a 
requirement is too “subjective” and “unworkable.”190  Moreover, in the 
words of the dissenting opinion in Deutsche Bank, this requirement 
 
 181. See id. ¶ 304 (“The Arbitral Tribunal is persuaded that the duration criterion is 
satisfied in this case.  The Hedging Agreement commitment was for twelve months.  
Moreover, Deutsche Bank had already spent two years negotiating the Agreement.  The fact 
that it was terminated after 125 days is irrelevant.”). 
 182. See id. ¶ 302. 
 183. This Note will not address the “regularity of profit and return” criterion that the 
tribunal recognized as an additional Salini element.  However, for purposes of clarity and 
closure, the tribunal’s own words best articulate why further discussion is unwarranted:  
“[S]ome investments can [satisfy this criterion] although they were loss leaders.  Others 
may . . . be contingent on extraneous events . . . .  The criterion should rather be qualified as 
an expectation that the investment will be profitable.” See id. ¶ 305.  Moreover, unlike the 
contribution to economic development requirement, like the other Salini elements, 
“regularity of profit and return” has no textual basis. See supra Part I.E. 
 184. Deutsche Bank, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, ¶ 306. 
 185. Id. ¶ 295. 
 186. Id. ¶ 306. 
 187. See id. ¶ 307 (“What is important is the commitment of the investor and not whether 
he positively contributed to the economic and social development of the host State.”). 
 188. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 189. See supra Part II.B. 
 190. See supra Part II.A. 
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“preserves a vital link between an investment and the intended purpose of 
the Convention” that is “emphasized not only in the preamble to the 
Convention but also in the Report of the Executive Directors of the World 
Bank accompanying the Convention.”191  The justification for this position, 
therefore, has two basic grounds—text and purpose. 
1.  Text 
The textual argument consists of three primary layers.  First, the 
preamble itself clearly acknowledges that the Convention’s purpose is to 
encourage economic development.192  In the words of a supporter of the 
Salini test, “It would be odd to expand the organization’s jurisdiction 
beyond the bounds necessary to do that.”193  This is further supported by 
the Vienna Convention, which requires that tribunals consider a treaty’s 
preamble when construing its terms.194  Moreover, because an article 25 
“investment” is undefined and its meaning is so widely disputed, there is a 
strong argument that it is ambiguous.195  As such, the Vienna Convention 
would require tribunals to consider the drafting history that discusses the 
preamble while interpreting the term. 
The second layer also is rooted within the Vienna Convention.  
Specifically, because tribunals are required to consider the context, 
circumstances, and preparatory documents used in connection with a treaty 
when resolving cases of textual ambiguity, proper consideration must be 
given to the ICSID Convention’s drafting history.196  Under this theory, 
therefore, because the ICSID Convention’s drafting history explicitly 
contemplates the goal of economic development in numerous drafts,197 
consideration of a potential investment’s effect on economic development 
ought to be considered when determining the existence of an investment as 
contemplated by article 25.198 
The third layer is found within the Report of the Executive Directors of 
the World Bank that accompanied the Convention.  It explicitly states: 
In submitting the attached Convention to governments, the Executive 
Directors are prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership 
between countries in the cause of economic development. The creation of 
an institution designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes between 
States and foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an 
 
 191. Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/02, Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 46 (October 23, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1273.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR6F-L43N].  The 
tribunal also noted that “[w]hether a financial transaction is an investment must be judged at 
the time of its inception.” Id. ¶ 52. 
 192. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, pmbl. 
 193. Grabowski, supra note 116, at 304. 
 194. See VCLT, supra note 120, art. 31. 
 195. See supra note 135. 
 196. See Grabowski, supra note 116, at 304. 
 197. See, e.g., 1 ICSID, supra note 81, at 2, 18, 20 (considering “economic development” 
in the early preamble drafts). 
 198. See Grabowski, supra note 116, at 304. 
1268 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of 
private international capital into those countries which wish to attract 
it.199 
As such, by again viewing the Vienna Convention’s article 31 as somewhat 
of a bootstrapping mechanism (similar to the preambular justification 
argument), proponents are able to argue that this too is a source of support 
for the contribution to development criterion.200 
2.  Purpose 
Lastly, there is the more purpose-based argument.  ICSID exists under 
the mandate of the World Bank.201  In addition to providing facilities for 
ICSID arbitration, there is a strong argument that the threat of losing future 
World Bank financing offers additional compliance incentives for host 
countries.202  Furthermore, on a structural level, the “principal office of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,” one of the World 
Bank’s subsidiaries, is explicitly mentioned in the Convention as the seat of 
ICSID.203  Because the World Bank has the clear goal of furthering 
economic development abroad, therefore, it is argued that its association 
with ICSID would make little sense if an activity hindering such 
development were to come under its protection.204 
Finally, an argument used by tribunals declining to apply the contribution 
to economic development criterion simultaneously serves as the criterion’s 
implicit support.205  These tribunals reason that the criterion is implicitly 
found within the other characteristics of Salini and that because it is 
implied, application based on it is unnecessary.206  Ironically, by rejecting 
the prong, they implicitly advocate for its inclusion. 
 
 199. Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 76, at 25. 
 200. See Grabowski, supra note 116, at 304. 
 201. ICSID and the World Bank Group, ICSID (Dec. 17, 2015), https:// 
icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20B
ank%20Group.aspx (listing ICSID as one of five organizations under the World Bank’s 
mandate) [https://perma.cc/8DFJ-EUPX].  The same page also states that “[e]ach of the five 
World Bank Group organizations contributes to the overall goal of poverty reduction through 
its particular work.” Id. 
 202. See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and 
the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 372 (2007) (“[T]here 
may be institutional gravitas that creates an incentive for sovereigns to comply with ICSID 
awards, lest they have difficulty securing future World Bank financing.”). But see SCHREUER 
ET AL., supra note 27, at 1108 (acknowledging that this is an “untested assumption”). 
 203. ICSID Convention, supra note 26, art. 2. 
 204. See Grabowski, supra note 116, at 304–05. 
 205. See, e.g., Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I.-Dipenta v. People’s Democratic Republic 
of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, pt. II, ¶ 13 (Jan. 10, 2005), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4321.pdf (taking the position 
that contribution to economic development is “implicitly covered by the other three [Salini] 
criteria”) [https://perma.cc/H72S-FL48]. 
 206. Id. 
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D.  Support for the Approach in Deutsche Bank 
(as Opposed to Mitchell) 
Several scholars and tribunals alike, however, disagree with an outcome 
like the one that resulted in Mitchell.  In particular, those who oppose it 
argue for an overly inclusive definition of “investment.”207  Submitting that 
the Salini test—particularly its contribution to economic development 
factor—is too rigid and formalistic, proponents of the broad approach have 
three main justifications for their support:  (1) that the drafters of the 
Convention expressly considered and rejected a definition for “investment,” 
thereby precluding the use of any objective criteria for determining whether 
an “investment” exists under the Convention;208 (2) the practical difficulty 
of administering a contribution to economic development criterion;209 and 
(3) that such an approach discourages investment.210 
1.  The Drafters of the Convention Expressly Considered 
and Rejected a Definition for “Investment” 
One argument made by scholars and tribunals who disagree with an 
economic contribution requirement is that, when the Convention was 
drafted, several specific definitions of “investment” were considered and 
rejected.211  In other words, if the drafters had wanted a definition that 
included such criteria, they could have included them.212 
As argued by Julian Mortenson, a proponent of a broad article 25 
definition, among the definitions considered by the Convention were those 
that included three factors on which “restrictive” tribunals rely:  
substantiality of contribution, duration, and whether the activity was 
commercial.213  Mortenson argues that the drafters’ choice to leave the term 
open and include a consent requirement via article 25(4), allowing parties to 
tailor a definition of “investment” specific to their particular interests, 
suggests that there should be an almost entirely deferential approach to 
article 25 “investment” determinations.214  Their intended “formula,” 
Mortenson explains, “was a broad and open-ended reference to ‘investment’ 
 
 207. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 315 (arguing for a test that accepts any activity or 
asset that is “colorably economic in nature” as an “investment”). 
 208. Id. at 297–301. 
 209. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/02, Award, ¶ 306 (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf (considering the criterion “unworkable owing to its 
subjective nature” as well as unfairly involving “a post hoc evaluation of the claimant’s 
activities”) [https://perma.cc/FX48-UZLW]; Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 85 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/ita0668.pdf (referring to the criterion as “impossible to 
ascertain”) [https://perma.cc/N89R-BPD3]; see also Boddicker, supra note 121, at 1055 
(also taking the position that the criterion is “unworkable”). 
 210. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 282–83. 
 211. See id. at 280–81. 
 212. See id. at 280–96. 
 213. See id. at 297–301. 
 214. See id. at 300 (stating that the drafters likely intended to limit the term to any 
“plausibly economic activity or asset”). 
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without limitation, combined with specific procedural mechanisms that 
allowed each state to create an individualized definition of ‘investment’ 
after the Convention was ratified.”215  Similarly, some tribunals have 
concluded that contribution to economic development is a goal of the 
Convention, as opposed to a requirement therein.216 
2.  The Practical Difficulty of Administering a Test 
That Requires a Contribution to Economic Development 
As the tribunal in Deutsche Bank believes, a contribution to economic 
development requirement would also be difficult to administer.217  Others 
share this view.218  One argument in support of this position is that there are 
different views as to what constitutes “development,” and that the issue 
with “trying to define ‘development’ is exacerbated by the radically 
different states of development that exist in the world.”219  Because some 
countries are more developed than others, the jurisdictional bar for claims 
brought against more developed countries would necessarily be higher.220  
Due to such subjectivity, proponents of abandoning this factor believe 
tribunals are “ill-equipped to make the kinds of judgments necessary to 
determine whether an investment has made a contribution to 
development.”221 
3.  An Approach Requiring a Contribution to Economic Development 
Will Discourage Investment 
Also of critical concern to those who view the development factor 
unfavorably is how such a requirement would affect potential investors’ 
general incentive to invest in foreign countries.  Mortenson argues that the 
Convention’s drafters chose to exclude a definition of “investment” out of 
fear that it would undermine the Convention’s stated purpose of advancing 
development abroad.222  Under this view, the drafters’ reluctance to define 
 
 215. Id. at 290; see also Perry S. Bechky, International Adjudication of Land Disputes:  
For Development and Transnationalism, 7 LAW & DEV. REV. 313, 317 (2014) 
(“Contribution to development is not part of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the word 
‘investment.’  By reading this test into Article 25, Tribunals are displacing the judgment of 
Member States about how best to use ICSID.”). 
 216. See supra note 133; see also Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 222 (Sept. 27, 2012), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB6C-
XG7R]. 
 217. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Boddicker, supra note 121, at 1054–55 (“Economic development is a nebulous 
concept, one that is not readily quantifiable and, moreover, is subject to divergent 
viewpoints.”); see also Bechky, supra note 215, at 318 (noting how such a requirement 
“adds cost and unpredictability to ICSID arbitration”). 
 219. Bechky, supra note 215, at 317 (asking if it is “even possible for an investment to 
contribute to the development of a country that is already developed”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 282–83 (“The Comment also reiterated the staffers’ 
overarching concern that ‘[t]o include a more precise definition would tend to open the door 
2016] CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT 1271 
the term stemmed from their concern that uncertainty—as to whether an 
investment qualifies for ICSID protection independent of the parties’ own 
definition—would discourage potential investors from investing in foreign 
countries.223  Such discouragement, Mortenson argues, would be 
inconsistent with the Convention’s goals.224 
Similarly, another scholar, Perry Bechky, argues that a broad approach 
excluding the contribution to economic development requirement is the 
only approach that can adequately respect the autonomy of parties to a BIT 
and afford them their “day in court.”225  This would arguably further the 
goal of predictability because the parties would be responsible for only 
what they explicitly consented to and would not be at the mercy of a 
tribunal that may or may not choose to consider whether there was a 
contribution to economic development. 
III.  THE REMEDY 
The problem is clear:  initially developed as a mechanism to further 
economic development abroad by balancing investor and host state 
interests,226 ICSID arbitration has since shifted its focus toward investor 
expectations, now protecting endeavors that contravene the Convention’s 
original stated purpose.227  Consider Deutsche Bank, for example.  That the 
tribunal deemed a hedging agreement worthy of protection under article 25 
should have, from the moment the award was rendered, sparked uproar in 
the international legal community.  It did not. 
Not only is a hedging agreement not an investment under any ordinary 
sense of the word—because it does not create value, it merely allocates 
payments—but such an agreement also may put a developing country’s 
economic interests in serious jeopardy.228  Part III therefore argues that 
outcomes such as this one can be avoided if article 25 is viewed as a 
gatekeeper that protects only investments that contemplate contributing to a 
host country’s economic development. 
 
to frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a particular 
undertaking, thus undermining the primary objective’ of advancing development by creating 
assurances for foreign investors.” (quoting 2 ICSID, HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 
204 (1968))). 
 223. See Boddicker, supra note 121, at 1055. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Bechky, supra note 215, at 318.  Additionally, Bechky argues that this impacts 
small investors “who have the greatest need for the assurance ICSID provides,” thereby 
impeding investment and, consequently, development. See id.  Bechky, however, provides 
no support for this statement. See id.  Moreover, given the large risks associated with 
international investment generally, see supra Part I.A, and excluding the exorbitant costs of 
international arbitration, see Franck, supra note 25, at 1592, any discouragement that small 
investors might face is probably hypothetical. 
 226. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, pmbl. 
 227. ICSID arbitration is quite expensive. See Franck, supra note 25, at 1592 (noting that 
such “litigation can easily cost more than U.S. $1 million a year”). 
 228. If one chooses to accept an article 25 “investment” as an unambiguous term (which 
itself is a dubious proposition), this would contravene the Vienna Convention. See VCLT, 
supra note 120, art. 31. 
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Given the two sides illustrated in Part II, Part III argues for an 
interpretative approach that includes a contribution to economic 
development analysis.  Specifically, Part III argues that contribution to 
economic development should be the only objective criterion of the Salini 
factors used by tribunals to establish a qualifying investment. 
First, Part III.A addresses the arguments made by proponents of a broad 
interpretation of an article 25 “investment” (as outlined above in Part II.D), 
and it explains why those arguments fail.  Part III.B then offers a new 
approach requiring that an article 25 “investment” include a contribution to 
economic development requirement to remain consistent with the 
Convention’s primary object and purpose.  Part III.B also proposes that any 
protected investment be one that is value creating (as opposed to value 
distributing).  In doing so, Part III offers a viable solution for tribunals 
trying to effect justice and limit ICSID’s enforcement mechanism to only 
those claims that it was originally intended to protect. 
A.  Addressing the Critics 
of the Contribution to Economic Development Criterion 
Before explaining why the article 25 approach for which this Note 
advocates is the appropriate one, it is first important to dismiss the 
arguments favoring the alternative approaches outlined above—namely, the 
arguments in favor of excluding the contribution to economic development 
requirement.  As explained in Part II.D, there are three main justifications 
for its exclusion:  (1) the ICSID Convention fails to define “investment” 
and, as such, any objective criteria may not be read into the definition; (2) 
such an approach creates practical difficulties making consistent 
administration a difficult task for tribunals; and (3) such a requirement 
would discourage investment.  Each argument, however, fails in its own 
right.  Furthermore, this part explains why future tribunals should no longer 
view the remaining Salini criteria as formal requirements. 
1.  That the ICSID Convention Does Not Define “Investment” 
Does Not Mean Article 25 Lacks Independent Criteria 
First, it is undisputed that the ICSID Convention fails to explicitly define 
“investment” for purposes of determining its own jurisdiction.229  However, 
to assume that the Convention contains no outer limit on states’ agreed-
upon definitions of “investment” is to accept a logical inconsistency.  Even 
the most fervent opponents of the contribution to economic development 
requirement concede that the Convention—with its title, text, and purpose 
explicitly contemplating “investment”—means to, at the very least, exclude 
some types of commercial activity, such as one-time purchases.230  
Nevertheless, an exclusion of such commercial activity is not found within 
 
 229. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra note 79. 
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the language of article 25;231 rather, it is inferred as an obvious limitation 
gleaned from basic common sense.232 
How, then, can those arguing for the broadest interpretation of an article 
25 “investment” claim that the Convention’s absence of an explicit 
definition supports the conclusion that the correct meaning of the term is to 
be gleaned merely through the states’ written consent, while at the same 
time taking the position that an article 25 “investment” also excludes certain 
types of commercial activity independent of the parties’ consent?233 
While it is true that the Convention’s drafting history is full of failed 
attempts to define the term,234 it is inconsistent logic to argue that article 25 
has some objective limitation to be inferred from a source other than the 
provision’s explicit language (i.e., excluding certain types of commercial 
activity) while simultaneously maintaining that the provision’s lack of 
explicit definition for “investment” supports a rejection of other types of 
objective criteria (i.e., a contribution to economic development 
requirement).235  Unless “investment” is to function merely as a fill-in-the-
blank term, enabling countries and investors alike to gain easy access to the 
most powerful enforcement mechanism in international arbitration, the 
argument—that absence of definition allows for any definition the states 
wish to impose236—must be viewed as invalid.237 
Because it is widely accepted that there exists at least one implied 
limitation on an article 25 “investment.” the argument that the Convention’s 
failure to include a definition for “investment” affirmatively establishes that 
a contribution to economic development requirement may not be read into 
the Convention cannot hold water. 
2.  The Contribution to Economic Development Requirement 
Is Not Overly Difficult for Tribunals to Administer 
While it is true that a test requiring the use of judgment and careful 
consideration of the facts is more difficult to administer than a bright-line 
test that requires little analysis, ICSID arbitration, much like any other area 
of law, requires the rendering of such careful judgment.  While those 
opposing the contribution to development requirement argue that such a test 
 
 231. See supra note 79. 
 232. See supra note 79. 
 233. See supra note 79. 
 234. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 235. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 236. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 237. More importantly, it would contravene a rule of the Convention that requires that an 
“investment” satisfy a definition that is independent of the party’s consent. See SCHREUER ET 
AL., supra note 27, at 117 (explaining that “a request for conciliation or arbitration must 
indicate not only particulars concerning the parties’ consent but also, as a separate 
requirement, information concerning the issue in dispute indicating that there is a legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment”). 
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is necessarily subjective and not “readily quantifiable,”238 this requirement, 
as articulated in the dissenting opinion in Deutsche Bank, “preserves a vital 
link between an investment and the intended purpose of the Convention.”239  
More importantly, this link ought to be respected. 
Consider the actual outcome in Deutsche Bank.  Application of a broad 
article 25 test,240 by giving meaning to the definition of “investment” as 
was consented to by the parties, led to a finding of ICSID jurisdiction over a 
dispute arising out of a hedging agreement.241  It is difficult to imagine that 
a hedging agreement, which poses the obvious risk of hindering an already 
underdeveloped country’s economic development, would be consistent with 
the purposes and aims of the Convention. 
Had the tribunal chosen to apply a contribution to economic development 
requirement, the article 25 analysis could not have been very complicated.  
Concerns over subjectivity and whether the requirement was “readily 
quantifiable” would have been quickly put to rest.  In particular, the 
hedging agreement limited Deutsche’s exposure to $2.5 million while 
leaving Sri Lanka—a country with limited economic resources to begin 
with—exposed to considerably greater financial risk.242  Such limitation 
and exposure runs directly counter to the Convention’s stated purpose 
because the very nature of the agreement involved one party benefitting at 
the other’s expense.243  Allowing article 25 to function as a gatekeeper for 
investments, therefore, would serve a distinct policy purpose by excluding 
activities deleterious to the ICSID Convention’s stated objective. 
Lastly, temporal concerns, such as those put forth by the majority in 
Deutsche Bank,244 are similarly without merit.  In particular, the majority of 
the tribunal was concerned that a failed investment, with the clear goal of 
furthering economic development in a host country, would be excluded if 
the investment fell short of accomplishing that end.245  However, as the 
dissenting opinion properly recognized, the time of a financial transaction’s 
inception should be the focal point of the analysis.246  Therefore, a tribunal 
needs only to look to and judge the activity as it was conceived.  
Accordingly, while applying such a criterion may involve some discretion, 
 
 238. See Boddicker, supra note 121, at 1054–55; see also supra Part II.D.2 (discussing 
the practical difficulties associated with administering a contribution to economic 
development criterion). 
 239. Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/02, Award, ¶ 306 (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1272.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX48-UZLW]; see also supra note 191 and 
accompanying text. 
 240. Recall that the tribunal in Deutsche Bank applied the remaining three Salini factors:  
contribution, risk, and duration. See supra Part II.B. 
 241. See Deutsche Bank, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, ¶¶ 293–312. 
 242. See supra Part II.B (discussing the lopsided nature of the parties’ risk exposure 
relative to one another). 
 243. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, pmbl. 
 244. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (referencing a post hoc evaluation of the 
claimant’s activities). 
 245. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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the administrative problems in applying a contribution to economic 
development criterion are likely overstated. 
3.  A Contribution to Economic Development Criterion 
Will Not Discourage Investment 
Finally, those arguing that a contribution to economic development 
requirement will discourage investment are mistaken.  First, they rely on the 
assumption that a contribution to economic development is difficult to 
quantify and inherently subjective.247  They argue that whether a given 
investment satisfies this criterion would be unclear, leading to more 
unpredictability for the investor and thereby increasing the risks attached to 
a given project.248  In support, one proponent points to the Convention’s 
drafting history, correctly asserting that a significant concern of the 
drafters’ in defining “investment” too precisely was that it would lead to 
frequent disputes over the Convention’s applicability, thereby discouraging 
investment and undermining the Convention’s purpose.249 
However, consider the language of the drafting history used by one 
scholar in furtherance of this position:  “‘[T]o include a more precise 
definition would . . . undermin[e] the [Convention’s] primary objective’ of 
advancing development by creating assurances for foreign investors.”250  If 
anything, however, this language expresses concern that a more precise 
definition would ultimately discourage a particular type of investment—that 
which advances development.  Therefore, the drafters’ expressed concern 
over including too precise a definition referred to types of activity that 
would already have furthered this stated purpose.  It is thus more logical to 
read this language as addressing concern over a precise definition insofar as 
it applies to a “type” of activity (i.e., a power plant, loan, service agreement, 
etc.) as opposed to concern over the activity’s purpose.  To consider 
otherwise is to render the comment’s language incomprehensible. 
4.  Side Issue:  The Problem with Salini 
and Its Subsequent Variations 
Finally, Salini and its variants present a separate problem.  Although the 
Salini test should be lauded for its inclusion of the requirement that an 
investment contribute to a host country’s economy, the remaining 
requirements (specifically, duration and risk) are descriptive terms used to 
define an “investment” in the ordinary sense of the word.251  By having a 
test that embodies the ordinary definition of “investment” in the form of 
rigid requirements, adherents to Salini implicitly apply article 31(1) of the 
 
 247. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 248. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 249. See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 282–83. 
 250. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 2 ICSID, supra note 222, at 204). 
 251. Unlike the other two requirements, the contribution requirement is implied in the 
contribution to economic development criterion. 
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Vienna Convention,252 because they are reading article 25’s “investment” 
as a word that is unambiguous and without special meaning, thereby 
contradicting any preambular justification for article 31(2) and (4).253  
Doing so also contradicts a similar justification for the contribution to 
economic development criterion under article 32.254  As such, requirements 
in Salini and its variations embodying the ordinary sense of “investment,” 
although useful guidelines, should not be formal requirements. 
B.  The Proper Test:  Value Creating 
and a Contribution to Economic Development in the Host Country 
The proper article 25 approach emerges from a textual interpretation of 
the Convention, the Convention’s stated purpose, and a dose of reality.  As 
explained above,255 treaty shopping and unequal bargaining positions, with 
respect to investment contracts, expose countries to great economic and 
political risk.  An approach that protects against this kind of outcome and 
comports with the Convention’s goal of furthering development makes the 
most sense.  The proper test should therefore consist of only two 
requirements.  Specifically, in addition to not being merely a commercial 
transaction, the asset or activity in question should (1) contribute to the 
economic development of the host country and (2) be value creating (as 
opposed to a hedging agreement that merely allocates value). 
1.  An ICSID Investment Should Contribute 
to Economic Development and Have a Territorial Nexus 
Recognizing the goals of the Convention and its purpose, each qualifying 
“investment” should contribute to a host country’s economic 
development.256  This is not to say that a failed investment contemplating 
this goal ought to be excluded.  Rather, such an investment should be 
judged at the time of its inception, irrespective of whether it ultimately 
succeeded in achieving that end.257 
As explained in Part II.C, the inclusion of this prong, unlike the other 
Salini elements, has found express support within the Convention’s 
preamble and preparatory documents.258  Because the Vienna Convention 
requires consideration of these textual sources when interpreting an 
ambiguous term,259 choosing to ignore the implications arising out of these 
textual sources would violate the Vienna Convention. 
 
 252. See supra Part I.E.3. 
 253. See VCLT, supra note 120, art. 31(2), (4) (giving “special meaning . . . to a term if it 
is established that the parties so intended”). 
 254. Id. art. 32 (deeming a term effectively ambiguous after the four suggested 
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 255. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra Part II.C. 
 257. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra Part II.C; see also supra Part I.E.2. 
 259. Considering how many qualified legal minds sitting on ICSID tribunals have chosen 
to interpret the word differently (i.e., applying different “investment” qualification tests), the 
ambiguity of the term cannot be disputed. 
2016] CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT 1277 
More importantly, failing to include this prong jettisons basic common 
sense.  Casting aside concerns of “subjectivity” and “workability,”260 one 
cannot seriously take the position that the ICSID Convention, when its very 
first sentence expressly acknowledges that it was created in recognition of 
“the need for international cooperation for economic development,”261 
authorizes jurisdiction for a dispute arising out of an investment that, when 
successful in the eyes of the foreign investor making it, would have the 
exact opposite effect of contributing to economic development.  Yet this is 
exactly what occurred in Deutsche Bank when the arbitral tribunal granted 
jurisdiction over an oil hedging agreement that, if successful in the eyes of 
Deutsche Bank, would have had (and did have) the effect of causing at least 
some harm to Sri Lanka’s economic development.262  This type of 
jurisdictional grant is an undesirable outcome.  In the interest of protecting 
against such a possibility, and respecting the Convention, tribunals should 
thus be required to include a contribution to economic development 
analysis when determining whether they have jurisdiction under article 25. 
Underlying this requirement is that a cognizable territorial nexus should 
exist between the host state and the investment.  In fact, this want of 
territorial nexus has implied support within the Convention and is arguably 
what justified the ad hoc annulment committee’s application of the 
contribution to economic development requirement in Mitchell.263  
Specifically, although the Convention “does not contain an indication that 
an investment must be located physically in the host state,” the Report of 
the Executive Directors and the Convention’s primary purpose refer to “a 
larger flow of private international investment into the territories of 
participating countries.”264  Therefore, although physical location is not 
explicitly required by the Convention for a grant of jurisdiction, the 
requirement that the investment must “flow” somewhere necessitates at 
least some connection to the host state.  Absent such a connection, 
triggering access to ICSID arbitration via the relevant BIT for many 
intangible investments (e.g., services or financial products such as bonds) 
would be rendered practically impossible.  Some territorial connection (at 
least in terms of impact)265 may therefore be read into the Convention and, 
by extension, into the contribution to a host country’s economic 
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 264. See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 27, at 137. 
 265. See id. at 140. 
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development requirement.  Failing to do so risks obfuscating both the 
Convention’s stated purpose and the Convention itself.266 
2.  An Investment, as Contemplated, Must Be Value Creating 
Whether an activity or asset is one that creates value should also inform a 
tribunal’s jurisdictional determination.  Again, such a judgment should not 
necessarily be made ex post,267 but rather ex ante because an investment’s 
ultimate success or failure is not relevant when determining investor and 
investee rights.268 
Consider again the result in Deutsche Bank.  A hedging agreement that 
involves no contribution of capital and, as contemplated, cannot “create” 
value for a country, but rather can only “distribute” it, is inconsistent with 
the notion of “investment” found within the Convention, as it does not 
adequately balance the interests of the investor and host state as is stressed 
by the Report of the Executive Directors.269  This is obvious when one 
considers the very nature of a hedging agreement.  A hedging agreement is 
effectively a bet that, if successful in the eyes of one party, is necessarily a 
failure for the other.  Balancing the goals of the “investor” and the host 
country would therefore be impossible:  their interests are in direct conflict 
with one another—as opposed to the paradigmatic investment described in 
Part I, where a successful investment results in simultaneous benefit to both 
investor and host country. 
The language of the preamble further supports imposing a value-creating 
requirement.  In particular, the preamble contemplates international 
“cooperation” as its goal.270  Instead of facilitating cooperation—as is 
expressly advocated for in the preamble—a hedging agreement that fosters 
competing interests would necessarily preclude the realization of this goal. 
Therefore, for ICSID to truly serve its purpose, the correct definition of 
“investment” should be broad enough to encompass as many activities and 
assets271 as the parties might otherwise consent to, so long as the 
investment contributes to the economic development of the host country 
and, in addition, is an activity or asset that is value-creating, at least at its 
point of inception. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there is still no consensus on the matter, a fair test for an article 
25 “investment” that is consistent with the Vienna Convention, the text of 
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 269. See Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 76, at 25 (stating that the 
“provisions of the Convention maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors 
and those of host States”). 
 270. See ICSID Convention, supra note 26, pmbl. 
 271. This is similar, in a way, to Julian Mortenson’s idea of including any asset or activity 
that is plausibly economic in nature. See supra note 132. 
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the ICSID Convention, and is consistently applied by arbitral tribunals will 
serve to provide ICSID access (and access to its enforcement mechanism) 
only to those whom it was intended to serve.  Moreover, such a test would 
best mitigate the paradigmatic foreign investor-host state dilemma by 
creating more clarity with respect to investor expectations and better 
protection for host countries.  By treating “contribution to economic 
development” as the only objective criterion that matters for determining an 
article 25 investment, tribunals can best reconcile those competing interests. 
